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Case No. 7674 
In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of U tab 
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
EQUITABLE LIFE AND C.AS·UALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
·---------------- ---· · -P..~~UD]r'T. BARNES, Clerk~ Supreme C'ou.l ~., ..... · Attorney for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statement ot Points 
Page 
Point Jlo. 1 The trial court di4 not err ia 
enteriag judgment in ta"ftr or plaintitt. 2 
Po1Dt No. 2 !he trial court 414 not .-r in 
enter1ag ttndings ot tact !loa. 4, and I 
'to the erteO't that defendant il~plq 
dem&llded a phyaieal examiD&tion as a 
prerequl.aite to re1ns1atemer.lt ot the 
poliey a~ lapse dWJ ·to non-pa,..a• 
o~ premiums within grace period., and 
that aaid requir·•eta were wa1ved. 2. s. 
Point _Ifo.- 3 !he trial court did not err la 
making .and entering tind.ing ot tae~ 
lfo.. S tc the ett'eot that the phyatoal 
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the etrect that the polioy became tn~ 
contestable by- i"- terms after two 
yeara. 6 
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In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
ETHEL LOUISE GREGERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion. 
Defendant and .Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 7674 
Appellant has fairly stated the facts, although we 
should like to make this addition: (a) It was stipulated 
by counsel (R. 12) that when the new policy was issued 
on June 1, 1947, the old policy had been in effect since 
Octo her 3, 1940. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Respondent's Points are the exact opposite of Appel-
lant's Points, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, namely, that the Court was 
correct in its rulings with respect to them. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
It is the position of the respondent, that in considera-
tion of the long duration of the prior term policy no 
physical examination of the insured was required either 
at the beginning or reinstatement of the present policy, 
as to any amount up to $3,000.00. 
We invite the Court's scrutiny of the policy (Exhibit 
"A") itself: On page 3 reference is made to an old 
policy (which it was stipulated had been in effect since 
October 3, 1940, a period of more than six years and 
seven months). This policy goes on to say: 
"Whereas Grant Gregerson the above (in-
sured) has for a period of 1nore than six months 
immediately last past been insured under a policy 
in the Mountain States Insurance Company; and 
"Whereas, all of the premiums due on said 
policy for a period of six months or more im-
mediately prior to the date hereof have been paid 
before the same became delinquent; 
"Now, Therefore, in consideration of the 
premises, it is here by agreed that the penal ties 
contained in the commuted benefits provisions of 
this policy are hereby waived as to the said Grant 
Gregerson to the extent of the principal amount 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the poliey heretofore in force upon the life of 
said insured, to \Yi t : the sum of $3,000.00." 
Now, if the Court \Yill turn to page 2 of the policy, 
it \Yill see "'"hat ''penalties" are waived by the foregoing. 
We quote: · 
"Comrnuted Benefits. (a) If the application 
of this poliy is accepted and a Policy issued with-
out a satisfactory Medical Examiner's Report as 
a condition precedent to the taking effect of this 
Policy, the Insured 1nust be in good and vigorous 
health and free from all bodily ailments and 
disease at the date of issue and delivery of this 
Policy or at the date of reinstatement after any 
lapse thereof. Otherwise, any benefits accruing 
under this Policy are hereby forfeited and the 
Company is relieved of all liability hereunder." 
What was the penalty waived~ It was the liability 
to take a physical examination and to be "free from all -
bodily ailments and disease" at the date of the policy 
or its reinstatement. That is our case; and it were almost 
supererogatory to go further. S·uch was the contract, an 
ordinary and common one, we take it, in the conversion 
of a term to a permanent life policy. 
The application, physical examination, indeed all 
the appellant says, would be pertinent, indeed, if this 
policy were for more than the old one; but it is not-it 
is for the identical amount, $3,000.00. 
That the Company itself so regarded it is apparent 
from the fact, that there is no evidence whatever that 
the insured was either invited or required to appear 
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before a Company doctor for physical examination at 
the date of this policy. 
, It is conceded by appellant that the rule of strictis-
simi juris applies to insurance policies, to protect the 
public. In the apt language of this Court (Handley v. 
Mutual L. Ins., Co., 106 Utah 184, 147 P. 2d 319) it 
applies especially 
"in the case of contracts which are sold 
widely to the average man under sales talk which 
cannot be too technical in its expositions and yet 
which very easily lull him into a belief that he 
has purchased certain benefits which on closer 
scrutiny of the contract are asserted not to be 
included." 
There is, however, no need to apply that rule here. 
Please reread the waiver supra. There is no ambiguity; 
there is nothing it could possibly refer to except physical 
condition and examination, the penalty listed under Com-
muted Benefits; and certainly the liability to physical 
examination is a very serious penalty. On January 31, 
1950, the insured had carried this policy and its pre-
decessor for over nine years, and we may assume that, 
as with all policies, a physical examination of him oc-
curred at that early date. He could read; he could see 
that this policy waived all further physical examination 
up to the amount of the original policy-it said so. He 
could also read in this policy under Reinstatement (Ex-
hibit A; quoted in Appellant's Brief p. 23): 
"This policy may be reinstated \Vithin thirty 
days and less than six months after a lapse on 
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pay1nent to the l~ompany of arrears of pre1niun1 
'Yith interest at the rate of 5% per annum ... " 
,, ... hen, therefore, he on February 2, 1950, tendered 
the premiun1 only t'vo days overdue (after carrying the 
policy for nine years) he 'Yas justified in the belief that 
the only penalty 'Yas interest on $15.69 at 5% for two 
days. But no-the Company required not only the pre-
mium but a physical exa1nination, contrary to the waiver. 
2. 
~~courts do not favor forfeitures, particularly 
"~here they are the result of technical provisions 
in insurance contracts, and forfeitures are never 
permitted unless the right thereto is clearly estab-
lished." 45 C.J.S. 150 Citing many cases. 
It is interesting to note that appellant claims the 
waiver referred only to a reduction of benefits. As the 
lower Court said in effect to appellant's counsel at the 
trial: "You will talk a long time before you convince me 
that the liability to physical examination is a benefit-it 
"Tas the very 'penalty' waived by the waiver." 
3. 
The Company by its own act imposed an illegal 
condition to its acceptance of a premium for re-instate-
ment, hence it cannot now complain that such premium 
was not paid. 
"Payment or tender of payment may be 
excused 'vhere, before the time therefor, if the 
Company has repudiated the contract, or by a 
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claim or forfeiture or otherwise has indicated that 
the tender would be of no avail." 45 C.J.S. 190. 
Cases cited. 
llere the Company imposed the condition of a new 
physical examination, which it had no right to demand. 
4. 
This policy, dated June 1, 1947, was written after 
the present Utah Insurance law became effective. The 
law (Chap. 63, Laws of Utah, 1947) was S.B. No. 34, 
passed March 14, 1947, and effective May 13, 1947. This 
policy, therefore, automatically became subject to two 
provisions of the law, as if written into it: 
(a) 43-22-1 (3) 
"A provision that the policy shall be in-
contestable after it shall have been in force 
during the lifetime of the deceased for a 
period of two years from its date." 
(b) 43-22-1 ( 4) 
"A provision . . . . that all statements 
made by the insured, shall, in the absence of 
fraud, be deemed representations and not 
t . " warran 1es .... 
The policy was dated June 1, 194 7 ; the insured died 
April 8, 1950; and at his death the policy had been in 
e,ffect two years, ten months, or two years, seven months, 
at the time of application for reinstatement. Aside from 
its contractual waiver of physical examination it was 
therefore incontestable for original representations 
anyhow. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
All of appellant's argument is based on two miscon-
ceptions : (a) that the insured was required to be in 
••yigorous '' health at the date of issue of the poli-cy and 
(b) that a physical exa1nination was prerequisite to rein-
statenlent. To grant then1 were to n1ake the waiver 
1neaningless; hence, since the findings clearly set forth 
the clarity of the 'vaiver, the judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLAUDE T. BARNES, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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